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Sublime Rauschen: Enlightening Sound
from Locke to Klopstock
MIRANDA STANYON
King’s College London
Once a critical commonplace, the ocularcentrism of the Enlightenment is
now as disputed within the history of the senses as the term “Enlighten-
ment” itself.1 Work in sound studies and cultural musicology is reasserting
the importance of sound to science, epistemology, aesthetics, and social
life in the long eighteenth century.2 In German scholarship, Rauschen—
a rustling or rushing positioned uncertainly between sound and noise—
has played a small but signiﬁcant role in these developments and in the re-
reading of the sublime that they provoke. Echoing older narratives about
ocularcentrism, however, some recent studies imply that music became a
sublime art par excellence only with a waning of Enlightenment in the late
eighteenth century, and only when music was aligned withRauschen as an
Research for this essay was supported by Christ’s College, Cambridge, and the Rae and
Edith Bennett Travelling Scholarship. I would particularly like to thank for their advice and
feedback Anne Janowitz, Mark Darlow, Judith Hawley, Pete De Bolla, Matthew Champion,
Megan Kitching, Simon Williams, Gavin Alexander, James Wade, the organizers of “Enlight-
enment Senses: Eighteenth-Century Sensorium(s), Theory and Experience” (King’s Col-
lege London, June 13, 2014), and the article’s reviewers at Modern Philology.
© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0026-8232/2017/11404-0004$10.00
1. On and against ocularcentrism, see, e.g., Walter Ong, Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the
Evolution of Consciousness and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977); Martin Jay,
Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1993), 85, 106; Mark Smith, Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tast-
ing, and Touching in History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 19–40; Jonathan
Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2003).
2. See, e.g., Penelope Gouk, Music, Science and Natural Magic in Seventeenth-Century En-
gland (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Smith, Sensing the Past, 41–58; Peter
Denney, “Silencing the Poor: Soundscape, Landscape and Society in 18th-Century Britain”
(PhD diss., University of York, 2008); Vanessa Agnew, Enlightenment Orpheus: The Power of
Music in Other Worlds (Oxford University Press, 2008); James Kennaway, Bad Vibrations:
The History of the Idea of Music as Cause of Disease (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012); Shelley Trower,
Senses of Vibration: A History of the Pleasure and Pain of Sound (New York: Continuum, 2012).
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overwhelming wash of unencoded and undecodable sensations. An oppo-
sition to unencoded sound is seen here as a keynote of Enlightenment, a
movement supposedly obsessed, from Locke onward, with “the mission
[of] build[ing] an empire of semiotic Puritanism.”3 Considering English
as well as German poetry, and drawing on eighteenth-century music writ-
ings and philosophy, this essay questions assumptions about the repudia-
tion ofRauschen before Romanticism, reexamines the sound’s relationship
with “enlightenment” sublimes and suggests reasons for some misprisions
of eighteenth-centuryRauschen in recent scholarship. The afﬁnities so often
seen between postmodern and Romantic linguistic thought have led to
fruitful readings of later Romantic andnineteenth-centuryRauschen buthave
ﬂattened our view of the world against which Romanticism supposedly re-
belled. In some ways a test case of sonic sensation for empiricists, idealists,
and rationalists, Rauschen and its cognates remind us of the multiple and
conﬂicting “missions” projected by the “empire” of enlightenment.
The title of this essay couples John Locke (1632–1704), a founder of
empiricism, and Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724–1803), a pietistic poet
often concerned with the interactions of salvation and sensation, for the
simple reason that both illuminate the concept of Rauschen. These writers
are analyzed alongside a group of German eighteenth-century music the-
orists; the rationalist and idealist philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646–1716); and Edward Young (1681–1765), a poet admired and be-
friended by Klopstock.4 The writings that this essay focuses on have strong
intertextual and cultural-linguistic connections, although, on the onehand,
their authors wrote in different languages and contexts and, on the other
hand, our discussion will “radiate” out from the “point of contact” (Ansatz-
punkt) offered by Rauschen to touch on French- as well as English-language
sources.5 Rauschen and “rush” conveniently have the same etymology and
share with “rustle” (and its cognate rieseln) root senses of movement, speed,
or shaking.6 Rauschen and rushing tend to happen to bodies, or mark their
3. Bernhard Siegert, Relays: Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System, trans. Kevin Repp
(Stanford University Press, 1999), 1.
4. Klopstock addressed an ode to Young and praised his Night Thoughts as peerless in the
“higher poetry” (höhern Poesie) of the Christian sublime (my translation; unless otherwise
noted, all translations are my own). See Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock,Werke und Briefe (Ham-
burger Klopstock-Ausgabe), ed. Adolf Beck et al., 40 vols. to date (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974–)
(hereafter HKA), Werke, 1:126; Der Messias, vol. 1 (Copenhagen, 1755), **2v. The poets ex-
changed friendly letters. See Klopstock, Briefe (HKA), 3:69–70, 80; 4.1:6, 88.
5. On Ansatzpünkte, see Erich Auerbach, “Philologie der Weltliteratur,” inWeltliteratur:
Festgabe für Fritz Strich zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Walter Muschg and Emil Staiger (Bern: Francke,
1952), 47–48.
6. See the relevant entries in the Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com, and in
Duden Herkunftswörterbuch (Mannheim: Dudenverlag, 2001).
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moments of contact and friction.Meanwhile, neighboring terms in French—
from bruit (noise) and its derivative bruissement (rustling), to babillement (bab-
bling), bourdonnement (buzzing), mugissement (roaring), and murmure (mur-
mur)—have Latinate roots that described sounds made by agents (lion,
asses, babies, insects, bulls, men, or fractious crowds).7
But beyond this kind of philological consideration, another reason for
namingLocke alongside Klopstock is simply that they sound good together:
all those o’s and plosives, one smooth l leading into each; the poet’s longer
name amplifying the philosopher’s. Then there are the associated sounds
of keys clicking in locks, horses clopping (aword related to klopfen, to knock),
or the rap of a Stock (staff) on hard ground. The attraction of sounds to
one another and to the ear is one way into the multifaceted problem of
Rauschen. Sounds can rauschen when, attracted to one another, they con-
gregate and swarm, creating associations against, or in excess of, normal
signiﬁcation. Often rendered as “rustling,” “rushing,” or “roaring,” and so
covering a range of acoustic intensities, Rauschen is also etymologically
related to Geräusch (noise or sounds) and Rausch (intoxication). In Jo-
seph von Eichendorff’s In der Fremde (ca. 1811–15), rushing and the dis-
orientation of intoxication conspicuously blend into one another:
I hear the little streams rustle
Here and there in the forest,
In the forest in the rustling
I know not where I am.8
Rauschen, then, often implies movement and association, but also disasso-
ciation—what we might call a disassociation of the ear from conscious
reasoning, and even from the subconscious perceptual work of ﬁltering
and sorting stimuli.
Alongside its proliferation in German Romantic evocations of winds,
brooks, and waterfalls, Rauschen has attracted increased theoretical atten-
tion in recent decades, especially in its senses as interference or static, or in
the modern collocation weißes Rauschen (white noise). Itself meaningless
and pitchless, white noise holds a theoretically inﬁnite number of fre-
quencies, forming an (indeterminate) ground for all meaningful, deter-
minate sounds. This dense congregation of frequencies is experienced as
a screen against which articulate sounds appear more easily. We strain to
7. See the relevant entries in Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française, ed. O. Bloch
and W. von Wartburg (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964).
8. “Ich hör’die Bächlein rauschen/ ImWaldeher undhin, / ImWalde in demRauschen /
Ich weiß nicht, wo ich bin” ( Joseph von Eichendorff, In der Fremde, lines 1–4, inWerke in sechs
Bänden, vol. 1, ed. Hartwig Schultz [Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1987],
173–74).
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hear and interpret this Rauschen in itself, just as post-Kantian subjects
strain to imagine an inﬁnity that is nonetheless the measuring stick for
all ﬁnite, determinate measurements.
For Kant, what took us closest to imagining inﬁnity—offering a nega-
tive presentation of a totality only accessible to reason—was the sublime.9
Closely following Kant’s mathematical sublime, the philosopher’s musi-
cally minded disciple Christian Friedrich Michaelis (1770–1834) wrote
that a powerful “downward-rushing [herabrauschenden], foaming waterfall,”
“ﬂooding sea[s],” or “wildmusic” could trigger the sublime.Michaelis’s sub-
lime is reached when reason bypasses the psycho-physical limits of our abil-
ity to process seemingly inﬁnite, overwhelming aural stimulus: rushing
sounds “tear our imagination along with such a power [Gewalt] that it can-
not grasp any totality [Ganzes], but instead, driven to and fro, as it were,
ﬂoats in the inﬁnite, and raises reason to the thought of eternity.”10
Modiﬁed versions ofRauschen subsequently fed into themodiﬁed Kant-
ian sublimes and limit-experiences of postmodernism. Here, however,
the Kantian telos of comprehending a supersensuous totality through
supersensuous reason is typically rejected in favor of movement with-
out goals. The hierarchies of surface and deeper meanings, innumerable
data and resolved sense, are inverted. Like the ideal children in Don
DeLillo’sWhite Noise (1985), engrossed by the television’s “waves and radi-
ation,”11 those listening for weißes Rauschen learn that the medium is the
message—its message: pure movement, aimless circulation. At its most in-
toxicating, this movement grants exhilaration; at its most sobering, an
awareness of whatMichel Serres called “the sound and the fury” of things.12
A slew of Rauschen-like sounds inform Serres’s anti-Kantian attempts to
think and write “the multiple as such,” not subsumed “under unity” (the
kind of unity achieved by reason in Kant’s sublime): noise, bruit, rumeur,
brouhaha.13 The multiplicity of subperceptible “background noise,” Serres
intimates, ismore sustaining, fundamental, andmeaningful thanmeaning:
“no logos,” he writes in a characteristic refusal of creatio ex nihilo, “without
9. Immanuel Kant,Kritik der Urtheilskraft, inKant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preu-
ßische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. to date (Berlin: Georg Reimer/de Gruyter,
1900–), 5:264–78 (§29) .
10. Christian Friedrich Michaelis, “Ueber das Erhabene in der Musik,” Deutsche Monats-
schrift 1 (1801): 44.
11. Don DeLillo, White Noise (1985; repr., London: Picador, 2012), 60–61.
12. Michel Serres, Genèse (Paris: Grasset, 1982), 23. English quoted from Genesis, trans.
Geneviève James and James Nielson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 7.
Serres of course alludes to Shakespeare’sMacbeth 5.5.27. On exhilaration, see Fredric Jame-
son, Postmodernism; or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1991), 10.
13. Serres, Genèse, 19–21, Genesis, 5–7.
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noise.”14 Insofar as the component movements and sounds that make up a
“rustling” are multiple without being articulated (separated and ordered
into a determinate totality) or articulate (in the sense of being able to sig-
nify and represent through grammars of resemblance and difference),
they likewise meet the criteria of Lyotard’s postmodern sublime: denying
“the solace of good forms,” “put[ting] forward the unpresentable in pre-
sentation itself,” “wag[ing] a war on totality.”15
In the wake of such developments, it is often assumed that Rauschen
was ignored or reviled until Romantics and post-Kantians recuperated
it to valorize indeterminacy, imagination, or chaos.16 In 2010, for instance,
Veit Erlmann’s innovative history of aurality, Reason and Resonance, sug-
gested that music became “the most sublime of the arts” only after Kant,
and only because music then “aspired to the condition of Rauschen, dis-
rupting the . . . Cartesian system of exchange, representation, and error-
free thinking.”17 Earlier music theorists and literary ﬁgures including
Haller, Goethe, and Klopstock apparently shrank back from Rauschen.18
A brief examination of German music theory between the 1720s and
1780s undermines this claim. True, theAllgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste
(1771–74), an important encyclopedia edited by Klopstock’s one-time
friend Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779), deplored swiftly “rushing” sca-
lar lines in advocating simple, singable, galant -style melodies.19 The pref-
erence for ease and clarity expressed in this entry on melody, however,
did not entail banishing rauschende movement from accompanying voices,
a texture recognized as “necessary” to the “expression” of “wild and rush-
14. Serres, Genesis, 7; cf. Michel Serres, Der Parasit, trans. Michael Bischoff (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), 28: “Am Anfang ist das Rauschen.”
15. Jean François Lyotard, “Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?,” trans.
Régis Durand, in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington
and Brian Massumi (Manchester University Press, 1984), 81–82. As Fredric Jameson notes
in the foreword to this edition, Lyotard’s essays are “a thinly veiled polemic against Jürgen
Habermas’s . . . vision of a ‘noisefree,’ transparent, fully communicational society,” a vision
aligned with Enlightenment (vii). On Lyotard and music without “good forms,” see Kiene
Brillenburg Wurth,Musically Sublime: Indeterminacy, Inﬁnity, Irresolvability (Ashland, OH: Ford-
ham University Press, 2009), esp. 104–38.
16. A notable exception is Rüdiger Campe, “The Rauschen of the Waves,” trans. Simon
Richter, Substance 61 (1990): 21–31.
17. Veit Erlmann, Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality (New York: Zone
Books, 2010), 168; cf. Susanne Scharnowski, “‘Es spricht nicht, es rauscht und toset nur!’
Eine kurze Geschichte der Ästhetik des Erhabenen und des Rauschens,” in Rauschen: Seine
Phänomenologie und Semantik zwischen Sinn und Störung, ed. Andreas Hiepko and Katja Stopka
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001).
18. Erlmann, Reason and Resonance, 167.
19. Johann Georg Sulzer, ed., Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, 2 vols. (Leipzig:
Weidmann, 1771–74), s.v. “Melodie,” 2:756.
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ing [rauschend ]” pieces.20 In some cases, rare but not unmusical, melody
itself portrays “more of an onward-rushing cry [ fortrauschendes Geschrei]
than an actual song [würklichen Gesang].”21
This recognition of a special class of melodies working through rather
than against rushing echoes an earlier entry in the encyclopedia on the
Lied. Here, a distinction emerged between the simplicity and unity of tone
and affect in Lieder and the complexity and internal changeableness of
“odes,” where “one strophe [can] ﬂo[w] softly, while the others impetu-
ously rush [rauschen]. The ode’s lofty and irregular ﬂight cannot occur in
the Lied.”22 The preface to Klopstock’s Geistliche Lieder (1758), a work cited
in this entry, had drawn similar distinctions between easily grasped, beau-
tiful Lieder and difﬁcult, sublime Gesänge.23 Klopstock himself was evoking
existing distinctions between simple genres and the sublimity of difﬁcult
ode forms, especially Pindarics. The Pindaric’s ﬁery, irregular, sublime
ﬂight had been praised by Longinus and was drawn into the Allgemeine
Theorie’s own discussion of the symphony.24
A connection between Rauschen and the sublime is also detectable in
Sulzer’s article on landscape. “The roaring [Rauschen] of a mighty water-
fall” and “onrushing [Heranrauschen] of a great storm” here belong to a
physico-theological schema of providential astonishment, a schema aligned
with the sublime from the early eighteenth century.25 Terrifying rushing
sounds drive home our “weakness and dependence on higher powers”
and give us a sensuous intimation of “the omnipotent power which reigns
in all of nature.”26 For primitive “untaught human[s],” terrifyingnature pro-
vided “ﬁrst conceptions of the divinity”; for modern humans, it develops
20. Ibid., 2:759.
21. Ibid., 2:754.
22. Ibid., s.v. “Lied (Dichtkunst),” 2:713.
23. Ibid., 2:714; Klopstock, “Einleitung,” in Geistliche Lieder (Copenhagen: Friedrich
Christian Pelt, 1758), 5–17.
24. Longinus, On the Sublime, trans. D. A. Russell, in Aristotle: Poetics; Longinus: On the Sub-
lime; Demetrius: On Style, ed. StephenHalliwell et al. (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press,
1995), sec. 33.5; Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie, s.v. “Symphonie,” 2:1122: “Such an allegro is within
the symphony what a Pindaric ode is within poetry: it elevates and shocks . . . the soul of the
listener, and to be successful demands the same spirit, the same sublime imagination, and the
same artistry” (Ein solches Allegro in der Symphonie ist, was eine pindarische Ode in der
Poesie ist, es erhebt und erschüttert . . . die Seele des Zuhörers, und erfodert denselben
Geist, dieselbe erhabene Einbildungskraft, und dieselbe Kunstwissenschaft). Compare Mark
Evan Bonds, “The Symphony as Pindaric Ode,” in Haydn and His World, ed. Elaine Sisman
(Princeton University Press, 1997).
25. On physico-theology and the sublime, see Carsten Zelle, “Das Erhabene in der
deutschen Frühaufklärung. Zum Einﬂuß der englischen Physikotheologie auf Barthold
Heinrich Brockes’ Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott,” Arcadia 25 (1990): 225–41.
26. Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie, s.v. “Landschaft,” 2:653–54.
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“moral and emotional sentiments [Empﬁndungen]” by teaching us to “ad-
mire the great, the novel, and the uncommon.”27
So although Sulzer’s encyclopedia repeatedly laments that improving,
uniﬁed, lucid, affect-oriented Lieder are neglected for “rauschende concer-
tos”—with their “rauschende, meaningless” ripieno voices—Rauschen is nev-
ertheless associated not only with themeaningless and distracting noise of
a fashionable modernity but also with the difﬁcult, rareﬁed yet wild, aes-
thetic of the sublime, discerned in nature and art by the profound critic.28
This is a coincidence of the wild and natural with the elite and cultivated.29
It draws attention to something that will emerge increasingly strongly in
this essay: the image of sublime Rauschen as a channel between ﬁrst and
second natures, an energetic, sensuous passage between untamed nature
and the reformed and reforming sphere of poetry and culture.
The equivocation about Rauschen in Sulzer’s encyclopedia resonates
with an earlier Berlin publication, Christian Gottfried Krause’s Von der
musikalischen Poesie (1752). Krause was a proliﬁc composer of song texts
and passionate advocate of the noble simplicity and emotional appeal as-
sociated with Lieder in the Allgemeine Theorie.30 In keeping with the reso-
nance model of hearing developed in the later seventeenth century and
subsequent developments in nerve theory, Krause reasons that “music
consists in movements” of the air and “aural nerves” and that music must
therefore represent movements, whether invisible-internal (affective) or
visible-external (physical).31 Exemplary external movements include dif-
fuse, kinetic, sometimes violent sounds apparently akin to Rauschen: “rat-
tling” (rasselnd), “howling” (Heulen), “thundering, cracking” (Donnern,
Krachen), “billowing, foaming, bubbling” (wallend, schäumend, sprudelnd),
“trickling,murmuring” (rieselnd,murmelnd).32 Yet Krause notes that “wind
and waves, the lisping of leaves, the Rauschen of a stream, thunder and
27. Ibid.: “das Große, das Neue, das Ausserordentliche bewundern lernen.” Compare the
vocabulary of Joseph Addison’s second essay on “Pleasures of Imagination,” Spectator, no. 412
(June 23, 1712), inThe Spectator, vol. 4, ed. Donald Bond (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 540–44.
28. Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie, s.vv. “Musik,” 2:788; “Lied (Dichtkunst),” 2:717; “Ripien-
stimmen,” 2:987. Further complicating the values in play, there is an intimate relationship
between the vogue for simple Lieder in this milieu and the German reception of the sublime,
associated not solely with complexity and difﬁculty, but also with soul-piercing edle Einfalt
(noble simplicity). See Dietmar Till, Das doppelte Erhabene: Eine Argumentationsﬁgur von der
Antike bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006), 234–316.
29. On this connection of the wild and civilized, see Matthew Riley, “Civilizing the Sav-
age: Johann Georg Sulzer and the ‘Aesthetic Force’ of Music,” Journal of the Royal Musical
Association 127 (2002): 1–22.
30. On Krause, see Daniel Berg, The Correspondence of Christian Gottfried Krause: A Music
Lover in the Age of Sensibility (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
31. Christian Gottfried Krause, Von der musikalischen Poesie (Berlin: Voß, 1752), 198.
32. Ibid., 198–99.
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lightning, are completely incapable ofmusical imitation,” sincemusicmust
always maintain “charm” or “grace” (Anmuth).33 It remains unclear, how-
ever, why thundering should be illustrative and also proscribed, and why
the relatively gentle movements of leaves and streams should be uncharm-
ing. The musical movements of emotion, tellingly, are not all charming.
Krause’s exemplars include misery, rage, horror, fear, and desperation,
alongside mixed feelings redolent of the sublime: “pleasant fear, lovely di-
vine terror, awedpleasure” (angenehmeFurcht, holdes heiliges Schrecken,
Ehrfurchts volle Lust).34
In short, Krause provides a confusing account ofmusical and unmusical
phenomena and words. It struggles to reconcile the demands of natural-
sensualistmovements (the empirical world), imitation of nature (theworld
of representation), and “natural” gracefulness (theworld ofmores andmo-
rality). The text’s equivocation perhaps points to strains internal to themi-
lieu of Krause as well as Sulzer and his collaborators, a milieu linked with
the so-called ﬁrst Berlin Liederschule, with its insistence on simplicity and
textural lucidity, and more broadly with the paradoxical values of natural-
yet-polished galanterie and ingenium permeating the Berlin of Frederick
the Great (r. 1740–72).35
Beyond this milieu, Rauschen accrued more positive connotations. The
Musikalisch-kritische Bibliothek (1778–79) of JohannNikolaus Forkel (1749–
1818), a Göttingen-based musician now best remembered as J. S. Bach’s
ﬁrst biographer, associated Rauschen with concepts overlapping with sub-
limity: splendor, immersive illusionism, and the primitive. An ode to Han-
del reprinted in the Bibliothek enthuses over the “magniﬁcent sound of
the rushing strings” (prächtigen Schall der rauschenden Saiten) in an op-
era; over the composer’s “sublime song,” in which “the surges of the sea
roar” (die Wogen des Meers [rauschen]); and over the magic wrought
by the keyboard, a single, domestic instrument able to summon up, ﬁrst,
a whole orchestral overture, “And then the curtains rush[ing] up; [then]
the arias [being] sung / Through the silver strings.”36 Possibly alluding to
33. Ibid., 199.
34. On such feelings and the sublime, see Zelle, “Das Erhabene.”
35. On this milieu, see Berg, Correspondence, xi–xxix; Thomas Christensen, introduction
to Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment: Selected Writings of
Johann Georg Sulzer and Heinrich Christoph Koch, ed. Nancy Baker and Thomas Christensen
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3–24; Laurenz Lütteken, Ute Pott, and Carsten Zelle,
eds., Urbanität als Aufklärung: Karl Wilhelm Ramler und die Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttin-
gen: Wallstein, 2003); Daniel Heartz,Music in European Capitals: The Galant Style, 1720–1780
(New York: Norton, 2003), 354–439; on ingenium and the galant, see Till, Doppeltes Erhabene,
234–48.
36. “Und dann rauschet der Vorhang empor; die Arie singet / Durch die silbernen
Saiten” (Johann Nikolaus Forkel, Musikalisch-kritische Bibliothek, 3 vols. [Gotha: Ettinger,
1778–79], 3:343–45).
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Klopstock’s Frühlingsfeyer—a poem to which we will return—another ode
in the Bibliothek pictures Wilhelm Friedemann Bach’s listener rapt above
the world, where
The ocean rushes under him
A droplet—and the chariot of the Sun
Is beheld as a spark!37
Elsewhere, discussing the difﬁculties of reviving ancient music for pol-
ished modern ears, Forkel observes that, the closer a nation stands to na-
ture, the more it loves “rauschende music” rather than “ﬁne” and “artful”
composition.38
More pragmatic than many commentators about the chasm between
ancient and modern tastes, and equivocal about the value of unimproved
nature, Forkel nonetheless recalls other music writers in associating Raus-
chen with naturalness. The multifaceted musician and diplomat Johann
Mattheson (1681–1764) set such naturalness within an imitative paradigm
in his Critica musica (1722–23), listing Rauschen alongside Sumsen (hum-
ming), Gemurmel (murmuring), and Schweben (ﬂoating) as words that “can
be well expressed throughmusical / andmelodious phrases.”39 In a similar
vein, Mattheson’s friend, the composer Georg Philipp Telemann (1681–
1767),marveled at theway the “soft rustling” (sanftes Rauschen) of a brook
appeared on the silent page of a nature poem by Heinrich Brockes.40 Te-
lemann gracefully regretted that his own music so inadequately imitated
Brockes’s mimetic feat. For their younger contemporary, the musician
Johann Adolph Scheibe (1708–76), oceanic Rauschen belonged to the pro-
tomusic of nature, a God-givenmelodiousness within external phenomena
that mirrored humans’ internal, God-given propensity to love and to pro-
duce melodious sound.41
Connecting these relatively disparate Rauschens in eighteenth-century
music theory, then, is a concern with naturalness and with movements be-
tween natural objects and cultivated products. Sometimes, nature falls
short of faux-natural art (as with Krause); sometimes, musical art falls
37. “Rauscht unter ihm der Ocean / Ein Tropfen—und den Sonnenwagen / Sieht er für
einen Funken an!” (ibid., 1:317). Compare Klopstock, Die Frühlingsfeyer, lines 1–17, in Werke
(HKA), 1.1:170–81; hereafter cited by line number, following Klopstock’s 1759 text.
38. Forkel, Musikalisch-kritische Bibliothek, 3:161–62.
39. Johann Mattheson, Critica musica, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1722/23–1725), 1:103.
40. Georg Philipp Telemann, “Gedanken über (S[alvo]. T[itutli].) Herrn Brockes Sing-
Gedicht vom Wasser im Frühlinge, als er selbiges in die Music gesetzt hatte,” in C. F.
Weichmanns Poesie der Nieder-Sachsen, ed. Christian Friedrich Weichmann, vol. 2 (Hamburg:
Kißner, 1732), 317, line 14.
41. Johann Adolph Scheibe, Der critische Musicus, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Beneke, 1737–40),
1:35.
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short of nature and poetry (as with Telemann); sometimes, nature in-
cludes and subtends art (as with Matheson and Scheibe); and sometimes,
sublime art rushes to create a second nature (and perhaps a second, post-
ancient, Rauschen, as implicitly with Forkel and Sulzer). This sample of
music writings helps to sketch out the prehistory of the intimate relation-
ship between Rauschen and later language philosophy that has been cen-
tral to twenty-ﬁrst-century interest in the term. In particular, it supports
Oliver Simons’s revisionist argument that Rauschen in literature around
1800 evoked “not interfering noise, but a message, sublime experience,
or [the] archaic.”42
Simons’s contrast between noise and message points to a crucial fea-
ture of the kind of language philosophy that has been the focus of recent
scholarship: it is primarily about semantics and semiotics, about meanings
carried by articulate signs and interruptible by inarticulate noises.43 The
materials for thinking about music primarily as a sign system might be
seen stirring in the passages touched on above, insofar as movements be-
tween nature and culture, “object” and “representation,” and questions
about the requirements and proprieties of representation (that it must
be natural, or charming, or scientiﬁc, or pious), are basic to semiotic the-
ories. Yet a binary opposition between meaningful musical sign and non-
sign/noise is not apparent. This is understandable if, in Gary Tomlinson’s
words, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “si[t] between a pre-
modern moment when musical semiosis participated in world-ordering
resemblances and a modernity when musical imitation came to seem tri-
fling in comparison to an impalpable, non-objective sublime.”44 Part of
the lure in the nineteenth century of the Kantian sublime, and of music,
is that both can offer somehow to get around the indirections and po-
tential deceptions inherent to verbal language understood as a mediat-
ing sign system, and to experience understood as mediated by forms and
categories.
42. Oliver Simons, “Botschaft Oder Störung? Eine Diskursgeschichte des ‘Rauschens’ in
der Literatur um 1800,” Monatshefte 100 (2008): 43.
43. Such connotations are invoked, for instance, by the title of the collection edited by
Friedrich Kittler, Thomas Macho, and Sigrid Weigel, Zwischen Rauschen und Offenbarung:
Zur Kultur- und Mediengeschichte der Stimme (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002). Katja Stopka,
Semantik des Rauschens: Über ein Akustisches Phänomen in der deutschsprachigen Literatur (Munich:
Meidenbauer, 2005), plays on the paradox of semantically analyzing nonsemantic Rauschen
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature. Compare Bernhard Siegert, “Die Geburt
der Literatur aus dem Rauschen der Kanäle: Zur Poetik der phatischen Funktion,” in Electric
Laokoon: Zeichen und Medien, von der Lochkarte zur Grammatologie, ed. Michael Franz, Wolfgang
Schäffner, Bernhard Siegert, and Robert Stockhammer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), 5–41.
44. Gary Tomlinson, “Monumental Musicology,” Journal of the Royal Musical Association
132 (2007): 365.
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Yet contrasts between the premodern andmodern are easily overdrawn,
and the eighteenth-century history of Rauschen is not encapsulated by a
shift from premodern resemblance (where natural and imitative “rush-
ings” should be simply unremarkable) to modern representation (where
“rushing” might be both more problematic and more appealing). To ex-
plore more deeply the freighting of eighteenth-century Rauschen in and
beyond language theory—in the history of the senses and epistemology—
and its relationships with music and the sublime, we can turn to a well-
known ode by Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock.
First published in 1759, Klopstock’s Frühlingsfeyer (Spring celebration)
has been something of a touchstone of sublimity in the German literary
tradition, though a sublimity easily parodied as enthusiastic, irrational, or
anti-Enlightenment.45 Swooned over in Goethe’sWerther (1774) and set to
music in Mann’s Doktor Faustus (1947)—where perverse homage is paid to
its “high-strung and rushing pathos of religious-hymnic praise” (hochges-
timmte und rauschende Pathos religiös-hymnischer Lobpreisung)—the
poem also testiﬁes to Klopstock’s fondness for Rauschen.46 The term ap-
pears six times in the ode, helping to weave together its moments of won-
der at creation, abasement before the Creator, and ﬁnal reconciliation
and exaltation. Indeed, reconciliation and uniﬁcation are essential to the
poem’s rehearsal of the sublime.
The ode, in a nutshell, contemplates God through creation: a specula-
tive vision of the cosmos’s immensity reveals the immensity of God’s grace
in creating and caring for Earth and its inhabitants; the unfathomable
smallness of a passing insect prompts ruminations on the immortality of
creatures; ﬁnally, God is recognized in a storm breaking through woods
where the speaker himself is located. Rauschen is laced through this narra-
tive. First, in the ode’s opening creation scene, “torrents of light” “rushed”
as they “welled up” and “ran” fromGod’s hand to forman “oceanof worlds”
(1–2, 14–17). In response, “choirs of jubilation” praise God in ravished
abandonment (5), paralleling thepoet’s own rhapsodic praise in later verses.
The sound of creation (Rauschen) here resonates with the sound at crea-
45. On Klopstock and the charge of enthusiasm, see Klopstock, Briefe (HKA), 2.2:680;
Immanuel Kant, Reﬂexionen zur Anthropologie, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 15:399–400; Jo-
hann Gottfried Herder,Werke in zehn Bänden, ed. Günter Arnold et al., 10 vols. in 11 (Frank-
furt amMain: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985–2000), 1:527–34;WilhelmGroße, “Aufklärung
und Empﬁndsamkeit,” in Geschichte der deutschen Lyrik vomMittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Wal-
ter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), 166. Isaiah Berlin repeatedly
cited a phrase from a poem by Herder closely modeled on Frühlingsfeyer as evidence of Her-
der’s Counter-Enlightenment thinking. See Robert Norton, “The Myth of the Counter-
Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 68 (2007): 645–47.
46. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Die Leiden des jungen Werther (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986), 30;
Thomas Mann, Doktor Faustus, ed. Peter de Mendelssohn (Berlin: Fischer, 1980), 351.
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tion (outpourings of song)—a pairing congruent with Klopstock’s Lu-
theran heritage, where singing God’s praise is the world’s vocation, not a
secondary response to, but part of, creation’s fulﬁllment.
As the speaker turns from the macroscopic and microscopic to his sur-
rounding landscape, winds “rush” and “rush through” the woods (77, 113),
smashing the trees in a cataclysmic storm that recalls the slaying of Egypt’s
ﬁrstborn at Passover (and so, typologically, Christ’s atonement). Raus-
chen thus links creation with destruction, common partners in eighteenth-
century accounts of the sublime. Klopstock’s theological sublime uses this
pattern to underscore God’s continual grace, insisting that the whole crea-
tion, including what looks like evil—night, lightning, rain—is a blessing.47
Even the destruction of the storm is claimed not to testify to God’s wrath
but becomes a skepticism-defying “witness to [God’s] approach” or “prox-
imity” (Zeuge des Nahens) (104). Like the wind, whosemovement is heard
and seen as it affects other objects, God is “visible” in the storm, yet also
transcendent, eluding direct apprehension (80). Klopstock again takes his
cue here from Luther, whose Bible translation used Rauschen for sounds
announcing God’s nearness and accompanying revelation.48
Finally, Rauschen accompanies the sublime’s characteristic ﬁnal move-
ment, where astonishing power is transformed from something to which
one is subjected into something elevating, something in which one might
participate. Having been stirred up by divine winds, the landscape itself
now takes on the power of Rauschen, as heaven and earth “rushes” with
“gracious rains.” The skies, mirroring God’s power in creation, unload
an “abundance of blessings” onto earth. This rushing also grammatically
links heavens and earth, which seemingly share the singular verb rauschet :
Ach, schon rauscht, schon rauscht
Himmel, und Erde vom gnädigen Regen!
Nun ist, wie dürstete sie! die Erd’ erquickt,
Und der Himmel der Segensfüll’ entlastet!49
In a sense, then, Rauschen uniﬁes and reconciles the actions of God and
nature. Certainly, reconciliation is emphasized in the last stanzas, by a
“quiet, soft soughing” (stillen, sanften Säuseln) (132) when the storm abates
(recalling 1 Kings 19:12), and by the appearance of a rainbow (recalling
47. The speaker asks: “Are you wrathful, Lord, / Because night is your garment?” He im-
mediately answers himself: “This night is the blessing of the earth! / You are not wrathful,
Father!” (Zürnest du,Herr, /Weil Nacht dein Gewand ist? / DieseNacht ist Segen der Erde /
Vater, du zürnest nicht!) (Frühlingsfeyer, 88–91).
48. See Lev. 26:36, 1 Chron. 14:15, Isa. 16:11, and Ezek. 1:24, 3:13, 10:5, 37:7.
49. “Ah, already rushes, already rushes / Heaven, and Earth with gracious rain! / Now it
is as if it thirsted! the earth is refreshed, / And the heaven relieved of the abundance of
blessings!” (Frühlingsfeyer, 101–4).
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Gen. 6–9). The ode’s singer recapitulates the iterative and abundant
movements of this typological salvation history in his repetitive exclama-
tions and overﬂowing enjambments—as in the lines “Ah already rushes,
already rushes / Heaven and earth . . . !” He thus might, implicitly, partic-
ipate in the sublime reconciliation he praises, joining his ode (song, q̓ͅdή)
with the heavenly choirs at the poem’s opening.
The workings of Rauschen here reﬂect the broader theological pro-
gram of the ode. Frühlingsfeyer functions as a synoptic progress poem,
reaching from the skyscape and its intimations of inﬁnity (a macroscopic,
telescopic moment), to the world at its most fragile (a microscopic mo-
ment), and at its most violently powerful (the entire landscape set into
motion, into narrative). Not only are different, apparently irreconcilable,
scales of creation brought into dialogue here, but different kinds of knowl-
edge: reality perceived limitedly but intensely through the senses, and re-
ality perceived limitedly but intensely through biblical narrative and typo-
logical allusion. As an emblem of movement and sound found both in
sensual experience and scripture, Rauschen symbolizes the kind of com-
munication that shuttles epistemologically between belief, speculation
and sensation, and soteriologically between judgment and mercy.
Rauschen is sublime in this instance less because it is indeterminate
than because it is general, common to God’s action and creation’s praise,
to genesis and destruction. It forms associations between potentially dis-
parate orders in a way that invites comparison withmusic’s creation, within
medieval metaphysics, of correspondences between audible sounds, har-
mony in man, and celestial music—correspondences Klopstock elsewhere
evoked very directly.50
Klopstock’s ode helps to indicate why eighteenth-century language the-
ory cannot be corralled into a Cartesian, rationalist, or semiotic pen, one
whose gates were ﬂung open by Romantics, post-Kantians, or postmod-
erns. For Enlightenment-era thinkers, one view assumes, language meant
meaning, and sublimity derailed meaning by interrupting limited, deter-
minate signiﬁcation. Locke is often taken to exemplify such Enlighten-
ment thinking in arguing that “language being the great Conduit, whereby
Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledge . . . , he that
makes an ill use of [language], though he does not corrupt the Fountains
of Knowledge, which are inThings themselves, yet he . . . break[s] or stop[s]
the Pipes whereby it is distributed.”51
Bernhard Siegert alluded to this passage in the opening of his provoc-
ative media history, Relays: Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System. In the
50. See, e.g., Die Musik (1796), in Klopstock, Werke (HKA), 1.1:527.
51. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1975), 3.11.5.
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beginning, he writes, there was “Noise [Lärm] and wrangling [Zank] on
all channels”: “Language was a pipeline . . . clogged with the ambiguities
of rhetoric. Philosophers were its plumbers. Thus began an epoch . . . that
equated transmission channels with language, language with communica-
tion, communication with understanding, and understanding with the
salvation of humanity. . . . From Locke to Wittgenstein I—or from the be-
ginning of British sea power to its zenith—it was their mission to build an
empire of semiotic Puritanism.”52
Rauschen, on one reading of this logic, is the noise of meaning-making
being interrupted. Theorists like Siegert put such “noise” at the heart of
modern literature and even language, staging a revolution against semiotics
and semantics, and so following the tenor of work like Barthes’s “Le bruis-
sement de la langue” (1975).53 In this context, pointing to problematic
Enlightenment-era predecessors tomodern semiotics helps to deconstruct
it; the more monolithic the semiotic tradition, the more satisfying its fall.
Certainly, there were strong pushes in our period toward semantics
and referential meaning, and these could be accompanied by denigra-
tions of Rauschen-like bruits and bruissements.54 In his essay Sur les opéras
(1677), for instance, Charles de Saint-Évremond (1613–1703) com-
plained to the Duke of Buckingham that, although opera music pleased
at ﬁrst, by its monotony it quickly became “nothing more . . . than a con-
fused noise” (n’est plus . . . qu’un bruit confus): representation’s job was
to force or impress, and music’s primarily to charm and ornament, as
producers of comedies understood; yet in opera, music reigned over rep-
resentative meanings and sense—achieving a pyrrhic victory, since its
harmonies alone lost our attention and became noise.55 Similarly focused
52. Siegert, Relays, 1; German from Bernhard Siegert, Relais: Geschicke der Literatur als
Epoche der Post, 1751–1913 (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 1993), 5.
53. Roland Barthes’s “Le bruissement de la langue” ﬁrst appeared as an essay in Vers une
esthétique sans entraves: mélanges offerts à Mikel Dufrenne, ed. José Augusto França (Paris: UGE,
1975), then later as an essay in Barthes’s identically named larger work Le bruissement de la
langue [The rustle of language; German: Das Rauschen der Sprache] (Paris: Seuil, 1984),
93–96. Compare Siegert, “Geburt der Literatur,” and Michael Franz et al., “Einführung,”
in Electric Laokoon, xiii, xv–xvi.
54. Note that bruissement is not a particularly common eighteenth-century term. It appears
only three times in the Encylopédie, twice in explaining that leeks can cure tintement (tinnitus or
tinkling), and once in an entry on drunkenness. See Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sci-
ences . . . , ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, 17 vols. (Paris, 1751–72), 12:881;
13:129; 17:689. Cited from Robert Morrissey’s online edition, University of Chicago: ARTFL
Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2013 Edition), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. Although un-
common, the term is evidently already associated, as is increasingly the case for Rauschen, with
confusion, intoxication, and dissociation from normal perception.
55. Charles de Saint-Évremond, Oeuvres mêlées de Saint-Évremond, ed. Charles Giraud,
3 vols. (Paris: Léon Techener Fils, 1866), 2:390–92.
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on sound’s potential to undermine representation, Jean Le Rond
d’Alembert (1717–1783), in the Discours préliminaire (1751) to the encyclo-
pedia he edited with Diderot, remarked tersely that “anymusic that does not
portray something is only noise [bruit].”56 The mark of music’s develop-
ment toward equality with theother arts was that it began to imitate indirectly,
not merely reproducing natural bruits but working more like a signifying
“language.”57 D’Alembert’s implied opposition between language-music
and bruit is echoed in Rousseau’s and other encyclopedists’ sporadic con-
cerns to separate the acoustic properties of bruits from a subset of agree-
able sons.58
Yet if Rousseau had some sensitivities about bruit, he also connected
the development of language and music, in its movement from inartic-
ulate cries into song, with humans’ inclination to imitate the “diverse
noises” (bruits divers) of wind, the agitation of leaves, or murmuring
waters.59 And imitative and semantic paradigms gave considerable space
to noise, rushing, and rustling within music: music most naturally repre-
sented not only sounds like voices, but also “all” affecting “noises” “in
nature,” and exemplarily the “noise,” “fracas,” and “roaring” of storms;60
according to d’Alembert,music would becomemore language-like byﬁnd-
ing equivalents between aural and nonaural experiences, and then signify-
ing the latter—for example, terrifying sights—through the “terrible noise[s]”
of the former.61
More important, eighteenth-century language theory was notmonolithic,
nor, numerous historians of linguistics argue, primarily Cartesian or purely
semiotic.62 Even the view of language in Locke’s Essay concerning Human
56. Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, trans.
Richard Schwab with Walter Rex (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 38.
57. Ibid.
58. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Bruit,” in Dictionnaire de musique (Paris: Duchesne, 1768),
60–61. See also Encyclopédie entries by Rousseau, “Son,Musique,” 15:345; Jean-JosephMenuret
de Chambaud, “Musique, effets de la” (the tone-deaf hear music as bruit), 10:908; anon., “Son
fondamental,” 7:56. Elsewhere, including in these same entries, bruit and son are frequently
used interchangeably.
59. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Louis de Cahusac, “Chant,Musique,” in Encyclopédie, 3:141.
60. Louis chevalier de Jaucourt, “Symphonie,” in Encyclopédie, 15:740.
61. D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse, 38–39.
62. According to Hans Aarsleff, “the tenor of eighteenth-century philosophy was anti-
Cartesian, and the primary vehicle of this reaction was the philosophy of language” (“Philos-
ophy of Language,” in Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen
[CambridgeUniversity Press, 2006], 451). See further Aarsleff, FromLocke to Saussure (London:
Athlone, 1982); Lia Formigari, Language and Experience in 17th-Century British Philosophy (Am-
sterdam: Benjamins, 1988). On German eighteenth-century language theory, see Avi Lifs-
chitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century (OxfordUniversity
Press, 2012). On later eighteenth-century semiotics, see David Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon: Se-
miotics andAesthetics in the Age of Reason (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984), 228–47. In relation
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Understanding (1690) is Janus-faced, looking toward Cartesian theories in
its account of signs and thoughts, but anti-Cartesian thought in its account
of language as conventional and public.63 More strikingly, Klopstock’s Früh-
lingsfeyer implies what wemight now call a “pragmatic”more than a semiotic
attitude toward language: utterances like odes, and sounds like rushing, pri-
marily do something (transmit praise, announce proximity) rather than sig-
nifying separable meanings or “Things.”64 In particular, the phrase “Zeuge
des Nahens” for the roaring of thunder in Frühlingsfeyer might remind us
of Downing Thomas’s description of the relationship between music and
language in eighteenth-century France.65 While eighteenth-century theorists,
in France and elsewhere, doubtedmusic’s imitative and referential powers,
music nonetheless strongly intersected with language understood as a
broader social practice with expressive, affective, phatic, and other dimen-
sions. Music can be cast as discursive, then, not only in the sense that it
might operate through language-like systems or grammars but also in the
sense that it “leads the listener to a self-consciousness that is deﬁned as
the awareness of the presence of another being,” a deﬁnition of discourse
linked to a shift in “the focus of the verbal paradigm . . . from representation
as reproduction to representation as a form of communion.”66
On this model, music can be sublime not when it sloughs off words and
aspires to the nonverbal condition of Rauschen—in Erlmann’s account,
breaking through the mediating codes of language and experience to-
ward the unencoded noumenon—but when it joins “rushing” and words
to lift the listener out of isolation and skepticism by testifying to “the pres-
ence of another.”67 The sublime has long been connected with avoiding
63. Aarsleff, “Philosophy,” 453–54; Brigitte Nerlich and David Clarke, Language, Action,
and Context: The Early History of Pragmatics in Europe and America, 1780 –1930 (Amsterdam:
Benjamins, 1996), 14–24.
64. For an apposite deﬁnition of pragmatics, see Nerlich and Clarke, Language, Action,
and Context, 3, 9–11. The authors note the strong connection between pragmatics and rhet-
oric, a subject central to Klopstock’s intellectual formation. See Kevin Hilliard, Philosophy,
Letters, and the Fine Arts in Klopstock’s Thought (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1987).
65. Downing A. Thomas,Music and the Origins of Language: Theories from the French Enlight-
enment (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 142.
66. Ibid. Thomas’s formulations resemble particularly the theory of phatic language ar-
ticulated by Bronislaw Malinowski in “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,”
suppl. 1 in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Inﬂuence
of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923).
See Siegert, “Geburt der Literatur,” 13–14.
to music, see Mark Evan Bonds, Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 3–5, 54–61.
67. On Klopstock’s polemic against skepticism, see Kevin Hilliard, Freethinkers, Libertines
and Schwärmer: Heterodoxy in German Literature, 1750–1800 (London: Institute of Germanic &
Romance Studies, 2011), 63–68.
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skepticism and solipsism. Longinus carefully separated the experience of
the sublime from intoxicated (berauscht) enthusiasm, and maintained its
cognitive and reﬂective dimensions. In the transferal of loftiness from
speaker to listener in the sublime—where, “uplifted with a sense of proud
exaltation, we are ﬁlled with joy and pride, as if we had ourselves pro-
duced the very thing we heard”—Longinus’s accent is not on deception,
but on what Stephen Halliwell describes as a communion-like “intersub-
jectivity, a transmission of heightened consciousness between different
minds via the penetrating language of a speech or text.”68 This sublime re-
quires “more than our own rapture: we need to be receptive to and aware
of an act of communication in which onemind’s conception of something
great can be felt to ‘echo’ (to adapt one of Longinus’s own most telling
tropes), in the minds of others.”69
Klopstock’s language use, then, evokes a sublime that is closely con-
nected with the particular qualities, and the very fact of, empirical sensa-
tions, and that is supported by a kind of pragmatic attention to discourse
as sound (rushing,music, words) thatmight be termed “protopragmatic.”70
It has relatively little in common with Locke’s empirical-semiotic model.
On a linguistic level, for strict Lockean empiricists, rushing would be the
distracting background noise in “Pipes” carrying signs that encoded mes-
sages about “Things”; on a sensory level, rushing would be of little impor-
tance: the sound of ﬂuid moving in the ear canal, perhaps, a secondary
idea of the sea’s motion, something mechanically generated when air
moves over objects. A third kind of sensory and epistemological rushing,
developed in explicit opposition to Locke, uses this sound of little im-
portance to undermine the principles of Locke’s Essay. In Leibniz’s Nou-
veaux essais sur l’entendement humain (New essays on human understanding)
(ca. 1703, published 1765), cognates of Rauschen model the progress of
perception, and become a heuristic tool that sticks a spanner in Locke’s
pipe works.71
Unlike Locke’s empirical subject, Leibniz’smonadological subject does
not register bits of external reality through the senses; rather, it already
comprehends or enfolds inﬁnite perceptions, albeit perceptions only par-
tially processed or realized. “There are hundreds of indications,” Leibniz
wrote, deploying a rhetoric of multitudes that mirrors his arguments,
68. Longinus, On the Sublime 7.2; Stephen Halliwell, Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpreta-
tions of Greek Poetics from Homer to Longinus (Oxford University Press, 2012), 333.
69. Halliwell, Between Ecstasy and Truth, 333–34.
70. The term is adopted from Nerlich and Clarke, Language, Action, and Context, 25–111.
Compare Lia Formigari, A History of Language Philosophies, trans. Gabriel Poole (Amsterdam:
Benjamins, 2004), 3, 113–17, on the eighteenth-century “transition from a semantics of ideas
to a semantics of usage,” the latter akin to pragmatics.
71. On the following, compare Campe, “Rauschen of the Waves,” 23–27.
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“leading us to conclude that at every moment there is in us an inﬁnity of
perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or reﬂection . . . alterations in
the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are ei-
ther too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying.”72 For Locke,
awareness of perception and perception are one. But for Leibniz there
are petites perceptions lying just under the threshold of conscious awareness
and forming the building blocks for fully developed, fully realized, con-
scious knowledge. We know we possess tiny perceptions because, “when
they are combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and
make themselves felt, at least confusedly, within the whole”:
To give a clearer idea of these minute perceptions which we are un-
able to pick out from the crowd, I like to use the example of the roar-
ing noise [du mugissement ou du bruit] of the sea which impresses itself
on us when we are standing on the shore. To hear this noise . . . , we
must hear the parts which make up this whole, that is the noise of each
wave, although each of these little noises makes itself known only when
combined confusedly with all the others, and would not be noticed if
the wave which made it were by itself. We must be affected slightly by
the motion of this wave, and have some perception of each of these
noises, however faint they may be; otherwise there would be no percep-
tion of a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred thousand nothings
cannot make something.73
72. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant
and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.
73. Ibid., 53–54; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Nouveaux essais, ed. Jacques Brunschwig
(Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966), 38. Leibniz’s aural analogies here and elsewhere recall
theories of harmonia mundi, the cosmic sounds normally inaudible to humans because—to
cite the music theorist and acoustic pioneer Marin Mersenne (1588–1648)—“they are too
large, like those of the cataracts of the Nile which deafen the inhabitants of Catadupa, if
the ancients do not deceive us [compare Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, in Republic 6.19]; or be-
cause the concert of the heavens is so ravishing that it lulls to sleep and charms our ears; or
we are accustomed to that music from our mothers’ wombs, and custom is a second nature
[compare Cicero, De ﬁnibus 5.74] that takes away our sensation—just as happens to those
who live near coppersmiths, blacksmiths, and armorers, for after some years they almost
no longer hear the noise [bruit] which at ﬁrst troubled them” (Traité de l’harmonie universelle
[Paris: Guillaume Baudry, 1627], 71). For the mark on Mersenne’s musical thought of Au-
gustine, also important to Lutheran-educated writers like Leibniz and Klopstock, see Peter
Dear,Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 80–
116. Mersenne’s thought world differs from Leibniz’s, but for both, as for Saint-Évremond,
bruit is associated with the old or customary, sounds that cannot or can no longer grab our
attention. This differs strongly from a self-reﬂexively “modern” idea of bruit as a sign of the
new and as-yet unassimilable, as theorized by Jacques Attali,Noise: The Political Economy of Mu-
sic, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), and discerned
in later 1790s music criticism by Michael McClellan, “Battling over the Lyric Muse: Expres-
sions of Revolution and Counterrevolution at the Théâtre Feydeau, 1789–1801” (PhD diss.,
University of North Carolina, 1994), 204–44.
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No logos, Serres observed in neo-Leibnizian vein, without noise: no articu-
late, realized, reasonable sounds without the multiple, confused, nonsig-
nifying blur of each rushing wave. But note that the composite, realized
sound inLeibniz’s example is another inarticulate noise, “the roaring noise
of the sea,” and not a logos.74 To reach divine and rational logoi, for Leibniz,
we must ascend above brute perceptual data—whether little rustlings or
stupendous roars—and attempt to perfect our perceptions through fur-
ther discernment, separating the individual sounds we already hear, mak-
ing perceptions increasingly clear, discrete, extensive and complete, and
so rising toward godlike comprehension of each part in the whole. Nor
are rustlings and roarings illogical for Leibniz in themselves, so to speak,
but only insofar as our attention does not grant them articulation.75 No
logoi, we might say, without tiny logos -potentializable rustlings.
In sum, if for Locke nonsignifying noise and rhetoric largely obscured
and excluded communicative transmissions, then for Leibniz Rauschen
contained and included everything that could ever be communicated—
an inﬁnity not transmitted into the ﬁnite subject from outside, but trans-
mitted into consciousness through subjective acts of perception. This
contrast does not, however, negate the complexity of Locke’s legacy, or
the creative uses of rushing, roaring, and rustling by “Lockean” writers
in the eighteenth century. One of these writers was Edward Young, a poet
who for Klopstock powerfully effected poetry’s “ﬁnal and highest” goal: to
energetically “move the whole soul,” and thus lead us up “some steps of
stronger and the strongest sensations [Empﬁndungen]” into “the theatre
of the sublime.”76 For Klopstock, the virtues of Young’s widely read Night
Thoughts (1742–45) lay in its Christian piety, but not necessarily in its di-
dactic theological content. Klopstock’s ode An Young (1752) portrays the
English poet’s “deep song” making his reader “feel” the threat of Judg-
ment Day, “feel what Wisdom desires / When she speaks of the trumpet /
The awakener-of-the-dead!”77 In this ode, Young teaches his poetic student
less to understand doctrine than to experience the call of an irresistible,
transformative, yet not-quite or not-merely verbal utterance—a trumpeted
74. Underlining that our attention is at issue, and not the given, material perceptibility of
sensations, Leibniz notes that we can become deaf to relatively noisy sounds like “the motion
of a mill or a waterfall” (New Essays on Human Understanding, 53) if we live beside them and
allow them to fall below consciousness, into the blurry irreal world of imperceptible percep-
tions.
75. Petites perceptions, that is, donot exist “in themselves” inLeibniz’smonadological schema,
where our realization of knowledge genuinely creates objects of knowledge, and tiny percep-
tions are ontologically less “real” than the fully realized concepts they can become.
76. Klopstock, Von der heiligen Poesie, in Der Messias, 1, **2r, **2v.
77. “Fühlts,//Dassdein tieferGesang . . ./ihmsingt! fühlts,wasdieWeisheitwill,/Wennsie
von der Posaune /Spricht, der Todtenerweckerin!” (Klopstock,Werke [HKA], 1:126, lines 8–12).
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utterance whose effects (to raise up the dead and summon them to judg-
ment) identify it as a performative, that twentieth-century paradigm of
pragmatic speech acts.
Night Thoughts elaborated a distinctly Lockean epistemology.78 Yet
Young’s 1728 ode Ocean and its dedicatory companion piece, An Ode to the
King, also celebrated a cognate of Klopstock’s sublime Rauschen. Oceanic
sounds in these odes become an emblem of Britain’s expansive mercantile
sea power and energy. Such sounds ﬁgure the medium of the poet’s pow-
erful praise, and his channel into the king’s ear to gain royal support.
Young’s sounds, like Klopstock’s, are partly biblical:Ocean’s motto is a para-
phrase of Psalm 98:8–9, “Let the Seamake a noise, let the Floods clap their
hands.”79 They likewise seem “protopragmatic”: the ode performs sub-
lime praise, its singer partly conveying knowledge and judgments about
the sea, but primarily undertaking to “divinely rave,” to “snatch the lyre, /
And plunge into the foaming wave” (Ocean, 21, 23–24) His speech-act is
also imitative: not unlike Mattheson with his mimetic musical rushing, the
poem seems to assume that it can transmit thenature of its subject (the roar-
ing ocean) through the sounds of its verse. And it deploys the logic of the
sublime, working to identify the poet with the overwhelming power of the
sea and to elevate him along with his song:
The wave resounds!
The rock rebounds!
The Nereids to my song reply!
I lead the choir,
And they conspire
With voice and shell, to lift it high.
(25–30)
Connecting songs of praise with semantically obscure rushing sounds was
an established classicizing convention, as Young makes clear. Using tropes
from Horace’s popular ode on Pindar, a Greek poet synonymous with
sublimity, Young transforms Rome’s “ﬂow[ing]” “stream” of poetry, and
Greece’s thunderous, “rowl[ing]” “torrent” of verse, into mere tributaries
of Britain’s sublimer songs (King, 26–27, 29–30).80 For only the British lyr-
78. Compare Edward Young, Night Thoughts, ed. Stephen Cornford (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989), Night 6, lines 413–61 (hereafter cited in text by section and line number)
with Locke, Essay, 2.9.15, 2.8.17. The parallel was noted by Peter Stubbs, “Edward Young,
and Locke’s Theory of Perception,” Notes and Queries 187 (1944): 14–15.
79. Edward Young, Ocean, in Ocean . . . To which is preﬁx’d, An Ode to the King . . . (London:
Thomas Worrall, 1728), 31; hereafter cited in the text by short title (Ocean and King, respec-
tively) and line number.
80. Compare Horace Carmina 4.2, lines 1–27. On Pindar’s sublimity, see Longinus,On the
Sublime 33.5. For a related contemporary theorization of sublimely “foaming” and “sound-
ing” poetry, see Aaron Hill, Gideon; or, The Restoration of Israel (London: n.p., 1720), 30.
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icist dares “To pour the billows”—the whole ﬂood of the ocean—“on his
string” (63).
Just as British bards absorb and exceed classical poetry, so too Britain
exceeds classical empire builders in sucking up the wealth and produce
of other lands through the ocean. The sea is signiﬁcantly a channel for
Britain’s physical and ethical wealth in Ocean, which plays repeatedly on
the term “main,” a name for the open sea deriving from an Old English
word for strength, virtue, power, or an army, and already used in the eigh-
teenth century to describe the main conduit into a building or street:81
The main! the main!
Is Britain’s reign;
Her strength, her glory is her ﬂeet ;
The main! the main!
Be Britain’s strain;
As Triton’s strong, as Syren’s sweet.
(Ocean, 43–48)
The “Main / Sublimes” Young’s poetry (King, 49–50), and is reciprocally
exalted by the poem as “Britain’s reign” and her lofty “strain”—her theme,
and the way the theme sounds.
Then something strange happens: the sound is turned off at the mains.
Rushing channels become carriers of anxiety and danger, and the posi-
tive charge of turbulent sound is reversed. “The World’s the main,” the
poet laments,
How vext? how vain?
Ambition swells, and Anger foams:
May good men ﬁnd,
Beneath the wind,
A noiseless shore, unrufﬂed homes!
(Ocean, 331–36)
The poem subsequently turns away from imperial expansion and oceanic
rushing, and returns to what was, in fact, its opening scene of landed gen-
tlemanly reﬂection, bucolic virtues, and quiet. The rural idyll at the begin-
ning of the poem contained a “rill” to animate the “still[ness]” of the scene,
but this streammade nomore noise than the poet’s thoughts (4–5). There
was perhaps implicit sound in the landscape, just as sound is implicit in
written words (and in the embodied process of writing them); but no
sound was consciously apprehended. Nature here “list’n[s]” to the poet
rather than making noise for, with, or against him (6).82 From his vantage
81. OED, s.v. “main, n. 1,” def. 8.
82. There is a play here on “list” as “nod[ding]” (swaying) and listening.
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of Lucretian “careless ease” in the pastoral scene, even the “boundless tyde”
seemed muted and docile:
Waves cease to foam, and winds to roar;
Without a breeze,
The curling Seas
Dance on, in measure, to the shore.
(3, 8–12)
The quiet of the countryside and noise of war and city (here symbolized
by the ocean) form an established contrast in the georgic mode Young
appropriates.83 But what prompts his speaker to leave the silent rill in
the ﬁrst place or return there again? One answer is purely generic: in a
brief, much-imitated passage in Virgil’s second Georgic, secluded nature
is the place where the speaker implores the Muses to “ravis[h]” him away
from earth altogether and give him knowledge of the universe, “the Ways
of wandring Stars,” the meanings of earthquakes and eclipses, “Why ﬂow-
ing Tides prevail upon the Main, / And in what dark Recess they shrink
again.”84 After this plea, the speaker returns to earth and hopes for a
quiet, inglorious life much like that extolled at the close of Ocean. Young’s
extensive journey through the roaring ocean and its turbulent passions
and worldly enterprises, then, can be read as an ampliﬁcation of the spec-
ulative journey of Virgil’s recluse.
Unlike Young’s oceanic knowledge, however, the knowledge hoped
for by Virgil’s speaker seems as quiet as the countryside: its model is Lu-
cretius’s mental journey through the bright but silent sky in De rerum
natura, exhilarating without being agitating, coordinated with the Epicu-
rean ethical and affective ideal of nonmoving pleasure or tranquility
(voluptas). Interestingly, Klopstock’s Frühlingsfeyer as well as Young’sOcean
can be read as exploiting and disrupting this model. Styled, on its ﬁrst
publication, “an ode about the serious contentments [or, we might say,
voluptates] of country life” (Eine Ode über die ernsthaften Vergnügungen
des Landlebens), Klopstock’s poem opens by explicitly rejecting a de-
sire for speculative ﬂight through the whole cosmos. Where Lucretius’s
speaker found a cosmos untouched by the gods, Klopstock ﬁnds God
everywhere in hismoremodest survey. And Frühingsfeyer refuses Virgil’s sep-
83. Compare Virgil, Georgics 2.459–82.
84. John Dryden, trans., The Works of Virgil (London: Tonson, 1697), 91. Another prob-
able intertext is Dryden’s translation of Horace’s Epicurean Ode 3.29; see Sylvae (London:
Tonson, 1685), 127–34. Here the “nauseous pleasures” of retirement are given piquancy
by the “tempestuous” “tide of bus’ness,” which, “like the running stream,” sometimes decep-
tively runs “with a noiseless gentle course” before “bear[ing] down all before it, with impet-
uous force” (lines 14, 52–59).
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aration of noisy town from quiet country and quiet knowledge: in Klop-
stock’s countryside, life and knowledge, like creation itself, are resonant.
Similar to Klopstock’s poem in this respect, Young’s speculative jour-
ney means loudly praising noisy exertions, passions, and active freedoms
that jar with the quiet life. Suvir Kaul’s deft account of this dissonance casts
it as a sign of Young’s “dual desire,” shared by many eighteenth-century
writers on nation, to respond to “the excitement of empire” and “whig-
gish” expansion from within “settled (‘Tory’) countryside moorings.”85 To
restrain the new empire’s ruinous excesses, new sources of wealth, power,
and culture are tethered to old. For, Kaul suggests, Young’s celebration of
empire is unsettled by “the specter of unbridled desire and its fatal con-
sequences that haunted the antimercantilist moralists of the age.”86
Where this interpretation suggests a poem pulled between irresolvable
ideologies, a slight interpretive shift to sound and the senses emphasizes
the poem’s coherencies. This is not to say that ideological conﬂicts are
not in play, but rather that Ocean attempts to present a positive program
(however imperfect or unsavory) for reconciling these conﬂicts. On this
reading, the ocean’s imperial mercantilism is tacitly absorbed by the pa-
ciﬁc landscape and soundscape it apparently threatens, giving rise to a
more extensive and integrated empire. Oceanic noises become some-
thing like petites perceptions or white noise, the constant background rush
of negotium . Against this rush it becomes possible to hear the pleasures
and philosophical-poetic traction of soft otium ; against this always poten-
tially disruptive roar, pleas for (royal) protection of otium and of the “mu-
sick” of poetry become urgent and plangent (King, 91).
At least four domains are connected with this incorporation of noisi-
ness into softness: moral economy, empiricism, the sublime, and poetics.
The poem’s progress clearly mimics the mercantile economy of setting
forth from home and returning again with raw goods. But this economy
also suggests the way a proper British morality can contain the energies
of (potentially rapacious) expansion within the bounds of rural satiety:
land/home is the destination of imperial wealth, but also its implicit
true origin—in the wealth of “daring,” “honest[y],” self-critical wisdom,
and benevolence that motivate and govern virtuous expansion (Ocean,
105, 108).
Just as complete Britishness meets and enriches the wealth of maritime
endeavor through solid, settled reﬂections and virtues formed at home,
so too in completed empirical experience, the subject enriches the rush-
85. Suvir Kaul, Poems of Nation, Anthems of Empire: English Verse in the Long Eighteenth Cen-
tury (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 199.
86. Ibid., 194.
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ing ideas of sensation ﬁrst encountered on the shore of the senses, that
liminal zone between interior and exterior. The raw materials of primary
and secondary ideas are then incorporated by internal/landed under-
standing and processed as ideas of reﬂection. The early appearance of
a rill running between shore and sea becomes signiﬁcant here, suggesting
a readiness for interaction between the nation/subject and the external
world, through inbound trade and the senses—senses that Young, follow-
ing Locke, elsewhere calls “small inlet[s]” that “Take-in, at once, the land-
scape of the world,” “And half-create the wondrous world they see” (Night
Thoughts, 6.425–27).87
The shore is also a locus classicus for an “enlightened” sublime, marked
less by agitated terror than by danger and exertion contained by reﬂective
distance: danger seen from afar and experienced vicariously. Lucretius
gave the eighteenth century a commonplace of this kind of sublime in
his description of the sweetness of watching from the safety of the shore
a mariner struggling in a storm, an analogy for the way the miseries of
human labor and strife add piquancy to the serene pleasures of philos-
ophy.88Ocean’s speaker is similarly astonished and yet reassured by the
prospect of endangered boats and the “rush[ings]” and “roarings” of
storms (55–108).
Finally, Young hints that the methods of the expansive, exploratory
poet—whose “ﬁngers ﬂy, / Now pause,” “Now dance, now creep,” “Now
dive, now sweep, / And fetch the sound from every string”—mean incorpo-
rating and tempering the “Blast” that “rushes forth” and “thunders in
[his] lay” into the more modulated music of patriotic praise (King, 74–
78, 83–84). Soft “sighs” as well as rushing blasts are “ﬁle[d],” “turn[ed],”
and struck “On anvils” by “Graces” whose “every stroke the work reﬁnes!”
(80, 85–90) The repeated blows, like the closely repeated rhymes of
Young’s tail-rhyme stanzas, will form patterns and “measure” that, like the
repeated, apparently noiseless, waves cited at the beginning ofOcean, trans-
form disorderly energy into purposively energetic and resounding verse
(Ocean, 12). This is what joins moral economy to poetics, making someone
who plays with verbal noises another counselor or philosopher-statesman.
Poetry not only immortalizes moral truths and historical virtues (as ex-
plained in stanzas 17–21 of An Ode to the King); its patternings of sound,
following classical modal theory, also modulate and temper national char-
acter:
How musick charms?
How metre warms?
87. Compare Locke, Essay, 2.9.15.
88. Lucretius, De rerum natura 2.1–17.
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Parent of actions good, and brave!
How vice it tames?
And worth inﬂames?
And holds proud empire o’er the grave?
(King, 91–96)
Oceanic blasts, rustles, rushings and roarings are the indispensable energy
this expansionist-mercantile music; rushing continues in the background
as the unapprehended sound of the furnace.
* * *
Siegert aligned the era of “British sea power” with an exclusion of
Rauschen-like noises from an enlightening “empire of semiotic Puritan-
ism.” By contrast, Young closely indexes imperial expansion to sublime,
semiotically underdetermined, rushing noises. In linking such sounds
to both language and trade, Young even intersects with a “post-enlightened”
theorist like Barthes, who paired the pleasures of rustling counters or ex-
changes of capital on one hand, and of words swishing past our ears on
the other.89 The rustle of language, for Barthes, was the sound of the new
nature that modern critics had to gloss, just as the ancients “interrogated”
the secrets of their nature in rustling leaves.90 For Klopstock, too, listen-
ing to energetic Rauschen was the job of the true critic. His epigram “Das
feine Ohr” (The ﬁne ear) (1774) mocked pedantic, academic attention
to sound:
Gleich dem thatenlosen Schüler der Ethik,
Hörst du in der Poetik
Gras wachsen; aber hörest nie
Den Lorber rauschen in dem Hain der Poesie.91
The most ﬁnely discriminating parser of verse can miss something con-
stantly running through the landscape, the breath that stirs the leaves and
animates the poet’s crown. Although Klopstock’s and Barthes’s writings
testify differently to the extent to which humans live in language rather
than nature, this epigram shows no facile nature enthusiasm. Leaves of
poetry do not straightforwardly transcribe leaves of laurel; there is a na-
ture inside language with its own wind and soil. As this conceit hints,
and as we saw in German music writings, rustling is connected with pas-
89. Barthes, Le bruissement de la langue, 93–96.
90. Ibid., 96.
91. “Like the inactive student of ethics, / You hear in poetics / Grass growing; but you’re
never free / For the laurel rustling in the grove of poetry” (Klopstock, Epigramme, in Werke
[HKA], 2:35).
Miranda Stanyon ◦ Sublime Rauschen 869
sages between ﬁrst and second natures across the eighteenth century.
This is the case in Klopstock’s religious sublime, which moves between
natural phenomena and the new heaven and new earth formed by typo-
logical interpretation and poetic recapitulation. It is also the case in
Young’s poetics, with their implicit movements between raw ideas of sen-
sation and ideas of reﬂection. Indeed, the empirical and imperial sub-
ject’s creation of a second nature, adumbrated in Ocean, becomes explicit
in Night Thoughts. Here “Intellect” “Interrogates” the ﬁndings of “Sense
and Fancy,”
And from the mass those underlings import
From their materials sifted, and reﬁned,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forms art and science, government and law.
(6.449–55)
This human world of “civil life” improves fallen nature and “Strikes
out, withmaster-hand, a copy fair” ofGod’s original “idea” of “human bliss”
(6.457, 459–61). Again, rushing is not far away. Within this “changed Cre-
ation,” the “naval thunders” of “Britannia’s voice” “rise” to “aw[e] theworld
to peace!” like a sea wall amid “furious waves”:
Their roar amidst,
Out-speaks the Deity, and says, “O main!
Thus far, nor farther! new restraints obey.”
(6.788–96)
Thunder against roar, awful conﬂict against sublimely awful peace, noise
against noise, create the second nature of reformed human society. Raus-
chen, as Rüdiger Campe observed, is “a matter of ordering,” and so “a mat-
ter of limit,” but simultaneously “a matter of the medium,” of “transmis-
sion within one medium and the transposition from one medium [or
one nature] into another.”92
Themeager role of “enlightened”Rauschen in recent scholarship stems,
I have suggested, from the eagerness of some critics to exhume andbehead
structuralist linguistics and semiotics, and so to focus on strands of cultural
history where semiotic language theories seemed to have reigned, and
where Rauschen had become problematic (as for Locke) or alluring (as
for countercultural Romantics). Yet Rauschen was not a sensation or a
model of sensation waiting to be rediscovered after the Enlightenment.
Nor were Rauschen’s connections with the sublime, song, and language
forged around 1800. For Young as for Klopstock, “rushing” sounds facili-
tate and even emblematize linguistic andperceptual transmission. Rushing
92. Campe, “Rauschen of the Waves,” 21.
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sounds were also material for their sublimes. The centrality of energetic
transmission, or “transport,” to the sublime persists through classical, En-
lightenment, and post-Kantian varieties of sublimity. Thismeans that a phe-
nomenon like energetic Rauschen can illuminate the long history of this
extremely variable aesthetic category, so closely concerned with sensory
excesses, sensory privations, and sensory processing. But the continuity
of transmission and transport should not obscure important differences
between varying models of sublimity and of Rauschen. Sounds in the orbit
of Rauschen formed a test case for different strands of Enlightenment-era
thinking, not only about hearing but about processing sensation more
broadly: Rauschen could be the essence of a pragmatic transmission con-
necting self and other (be that other nature, God, capital, or the king);
an obstruction to “proper” empirical transmissions of signs; or a rational-
ist’s blurry perception of the inﬁnite, a repertoire for endless, endlessly im-
provable, transmissions.
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